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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Tony Sallings contends the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief in light of a genuine issue of material fact – that trial 
counsel had rendered objectively deficient, prejudicial performance by not cross-
examining the confidential informant1 to impeach her character for truthfulness, 
particularly in light of the fact that the district court had just granted trial counsel’s 
request in limine to pursue that line of questioning.   
The State makes two arguments in response.  First, even though it appears to 
concede that the basis upon which the district court summarily dismissed this claim was 
clearly erroneous, the State contends this Court should still affirm the order for summary 
dismissal by drawing the inference that trial counsel made a strategic decision to 
abandon that line of cross-examination, even though he had specifically asked for, and 
received, the opportunity to pursue that line of questioning mere hours before the CI 
testified.  Second, it contends that, because the State was not relying on the CI’s less-
than-sterling overall reputation, trial counsel’s failure to attack her credibility in this case 
was somehow not prejudicial to Mr. Sallings. 
 Neither of the State’s arguments is persuasive.  The first is contrary to the 
applicable legal standards, and the second fails to address the actual analysis at issue 
in this case.  In fact, the second argument actually reinforces Mr. Sallings’ allegations of 
prejudice.  As such, this Court should reverse the district court’s erroneous order 
                                            
1 In its brief, the State referred to the informant by her name (Tamara Bowdoin).  For 
consistency’s sake, Mr. Sallings will continue to refer to her as “the CI.”  (See generally 
App. Br.) 
2 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Sallings’ Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 













A. The State’s Argument On The Deficient Performance Prong Is Inconsistent With 
The Applicable Legal Standards And Represents An Overly Simplistic View Of 
The Law  
 
The State appears to concede one of Mr. Sallings’ main points on the deficient 
performance prong of the Strickland2 analysis – that the district court made a clearly 
erroneous finding that trial counsel did not provide deficient performance by not cross-
examining the CI because he had simply adhered to the trial court’s ruling on the 
matter.  (Resp. Br., p.8 (“[Mr.] Sallings is correct” that the trial court’s ruling “clearly 
authorized trial counsel to engage in that line of cross-examination”); compare Tr., p.8, 
Ls.22-23 (the district court’s conclusion that “the Court made its ruling related to that, 
and Defense Counsel adhered to the Court’s ruling”).)  Therefore, the reason the district 
court gave for summarily dismissing that claim is invalid, and its order to that effect 
should be vacated as a result. 
Despite that concession, the State contends that this Court should nevertheless 
affirm the summary dismissal order based on the State’s belief that there might have 
been a strategic reason for trial counsel to have not pursued that line of cross-
examination.  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  The State’s argument is meritless for several reasons.   
First, it is inconsistent with the controlling standards at the summary dismissal 
stage of post-conviction proceedings.  At this point in the process, inferences from the 
facts are to be construed liberally in the petitioner’s favor, not the State’s. 
                                            
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004).  The State’s argument ignores that 
standard and asks this Court to draw an inference in the State’s favor – to justify its 
motion for summary dismissal.  This Court should reject that contention, as it is contrary 
to established precedent. 
Furthermore, the facts do not support the inference the State has proposed this 
Court draw.  The most telling fact, which the State even acknowledges, is that trial 
counsel specifically requested “at least the opportunity to ask about the alleged theft on 
cross-examination of [the CI].”  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  On the one hand, it is not reasonable 
to infer that, mere hours after convincing the district court to allow him to engage in that 
line of cross-examination, trial counsel would decide to abandon that line of questioning.  
(See Supp. R., pp.111-12 (minutes of the first day of trial noting the motion in limine was 
heard at 12:41 p.m. and the CI’s was sworn in at approximately 3:46 p.m.).)  On the 
other hand, were that cross-examination not ever going to be a part of his trial strategy, 
trial counsel would not have specifically requested the opportunity to engage in that line 
of questioning in the first place.  Either way, the inference the State is proposing this 
Court draw is unreasonable, and so, should be rejected.3 
                                            
3 Even if the State’s inference is a reasonable one, that is not enough to save the order 
for summary dismissal.  As the Idaho Supreme Court has held in regard to motions of 
summary judgment:  “‘If reasonable people might reach a different conclusion from 
conflicting inferences based on the evidence then the motion must be denied.’”  
Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806 (2010) (quoting Cramer v. Slater, 146 
Idaho 868, 873 (2009)); but see, e.g., Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437, 440-41 (Ct. App. 
2016) (affirming summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition in the face of conflicting 
inferences because the district court will ultimately be the finder of fact at the evidentiary 
hearing).  Furthermore, in a motion for summary dismissal, the moving party bears the 
burden to prove the absence of material facts.  Brown, 148 Idaho at 806.  The Brown 
rationale is applicable in the post-conviction context because, as the Idaho Supreme 
Court has repeatedly explained, in reviewing orders for summary dismissal of a post-
conviction petition, “the task of this Court ‘is to determine whether the appellant has 
6 
Second, the merits of the State’s argument amount to an overly simplistic 
understanding of the law which fails to appreciate various aspects about what trial 
counsel could have done in pursuing this particular line of cross-examination.  The State 
simply asserts that “[a]ll trial counsel could do was elicit an answer, and then accept 
whatever answer [the CI] offered.”  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  Of course, it is entirely possible 
that she would have admitted to taking Mr. Sallings’ property, rather than, as the State 
seems to presume, make a factually-inaccurate denial, when the question was put to 
her.  However, even if she would make a factually-inaccurate denial, fear of that 
testimony is not a reasonable basis to justify not pursuing that line of cross-examination.  
That is because such an answer does not immediately end counsel’s ability to impeach 
the witness’s credibility. 
Rather, the State’s argument echoes the oft-used shorthand statement – that the 
examining attorney must “take [the witness’s] answer” – when cross-examining a 
witness pursuant to I.R.E. 608(b).  See State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 711 n.3 
(Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation omitted).  However, that shorthand statement 
represents an oversimplification of what the examining attorney is actually allowed to do 
in such cases.  For example, “‘[t]hat expression does not mean that the cross-examiner 
may not press further to extract an admission, for instance, by reminding the witness of 
                                                                                                                                  
alleged facts in his petition that if true, would entitle him to relief.’”  Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792 (quoting Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934 (1990)).  If reasonable people 
can disagree on the inferences which can be drawn from the facts, that means there is 
the possibility the petitioner could prove the inference in his favor true.  In that case, an 
evidentiary hearing is needed, as that is the forum in which such proof is to be elicited.  
See I.C. § 19-4907.  As such, even if the State’s inference is reasonable, the order for 
summary dismissal still should be reversed because the State has still failed to carry its 
burden, as articulated in Brown, to show the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
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the penalties of perjury.’”  Bergerud, 155 Idaho at 711 n.3 (quoting 1 Kenneth S. Broun, 
McCormack on Evidence 182-83 (6th ed. 2006)).   
In fact, in a factually-similar case, the Court of Appeals explained this concept 
may not even prevent the defense from subsequently presenting extrinsic evidence to 
impeach such an answer.  See State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38-39 (Ct. App. 1988).  In 
Guinn, the defendant sought to impeach an informant’s credibility by cross-examining 
the informant as to the informant’s own illegal drug activities and by calling witnesses 
specifically to contradict the informant’s testimony under cross-examination.  Id. at 38.  
The Guinn Court held that, if the defendant were able to “provide sufficient foundation 
for his claim of bias and improper motivation, he may not only inquire of [the witness] 
regarding drug-related activities, but may introduce extrinsic evidence to refute [the 
witness’s] testimony if he again denies such activities.”  Id. at 39 (emphasis added); cf. 
I.R.E. 405(a)-(b) (allowing for both cross-examination of a witness on specific instances 
of conduct, and, if the character of that person “is an essential element of a charge, 
claim, or defense,” presentation of extrinsic proof of such specific instances of conduct) 
(emphasis added).  As such, there are several avenues for impeaching a witness’s 
credibility still open to an attorney questioning a witness pursuant to I.R.E. 608(b) even 
if that witness gives an unfavorable answer when the question is put to her. 
Therefore, had trial counsel actually pursued this line of cross-examination and 
the CI made a factually-inaccurate denial, trial counsel could have pressed her on her 
answer and/or laid foundation upon which to renew his motion to call other witnesses to 
impeach the CI’s testimony in that regard.  Thus, the State’s overly simplistic argument 
– that this Court should infer a strategic decision to abandon that line of cross-
8 
examination because the CI might deny stealing Mr. Sallings’ property and trial counsel 
could not have done anything more in light of that answer – is meritless.  As such, the 
State has failed to show a justifiable alternative basis upon which this Court might affirm 
the district court’s otherwise-erroneous decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Sallings’ 
petition.  As a result, this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on those 
genuine issues of material fact Mr. Sallings alleged in regard to trial counsel’s 
objectively-deficient performance.  (See App. Br., pp.7-9.) 
 
B. Besides Being Nonresponsive To The Analysis Under The Prejudice Prong In 
This Case, The State’s Argument About The CI’s Reputation Actually Reinforces 
Mr. Sallings’ Allegation Of Prejudice  
 
As demonstrated in Section A, supra, there were various avenues available to 
Mr. Sallings by which to impeach the CI’s credibility.  That is noteworthy because the 
CI’s credibility was of paramount importance to the State’s case:  not only was she the 
only witness who could actually tie Mr. Sallings to the drugs found in her car, she also 
had an opportunity, following a merely-cursory search of her person, to plant those 
drugs in the car at a point of time when no one, including the officers surrounding the 
scene, could see her.  As a result, for the State’s case to stand, the jurors needed to 
believe the CI’s testimony – that Mr. Sallings, and not she, had brought the drugs into 
the car.  (See App. Br., pp.10-12 (detailing the alleged facts in this regard).)  
Idaho Court of Appeals Judge Burnett eloquently articulated why a failure to 
impeach a witness’s credibility in such circumstances could reasonably have an impact 
on the verdict in his special concurrence in Guinn:   
If a witness on cross-examination denies a prior bad act which indicated a 
character for untruthfulness, and if it can be shown that the denial is false, 
the witness’s lack of credibility is confirmed.  He has demonstrated his 
9 
willingness to lie under oath during the trial itself.  The triers of fact would 
have strong reason to doubt his testimony on any issue.  Their skepticism 
would be no less abiding than if the impeaching party had presented facts 
from which a possible bias or improper motive might have been inferred. 
 
Guinn, 114 Idaho at 40 (Burnett, J., specially concurring).  Accordingly, trial counsel’s 
failure to pursue any of the available avenues to impeach the CI’s credibility, particularly 
after being expressly allowed to start down that path, was prejudicial to Mr. Sallings 
because there is a reasonable possibility that, had trial counsel done so, the jurors 
would have found the CI’s testimony to not be credible, and so, not convicted him.  (See 
App. Br., pp.9-12.)   
In its Response Brief, the State attempts to downplay this prejudice by arguing it 
had not relied on the CI’s less-than-sterling reputation to make its case.  (Resp. 
Br., p.9.)  However, while reputation for truthfulness may impact on a witness’s 
credibility, “credibility” and “reputation” are not the same thing.  Even a person with a 
less-than-sterling reputation may be deemed credible by the jury as to their account of a 
particular event.  As a result, the State’s argument misses the point actually at issue in 
this case.  The line of cross-examination which trial counsel failed to pursue in 
Mr. Sallings’ case attacked the CI’s credibility, not her overall reputation.  As such, 
whether or not the State was relying on the CI’s overall reputation, trial counsel’s failure 
to attack the credibility of her testimony was still prejudicial to Mr. Sallings. 
Moreover, any relevance the State’s point about the CI’s overall reputation might 
have to this analysis actually reinforces Mr. Sallings’ prejudice argument.  On appeal, 
the State argues that “central to [its] case was the fact that [the CI] had been a drug 
user and was working off a felony as a confidential informant.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  The 
implicit assertion in that description, particularly the part about her “working off a felony,” 
10 
is that she should be believed because of her reputation – she is only testifying to help 
the officers and would not get her charges reduced if she does not do so.  (See Resp. 
Br., p.9; see also Supp. Tr., p.301, Ls.20-25 (the prosecutor making this argument to 
the jury in his rebuttal closing statements).)  The line of cross-examination which trial 
counsel had fought for, then failed to follow through on, would have informed the jury 
that this understanding of the CI’s apparent present character for honesty is inaccurate, 
that she was not testifying to help the officers, but rather, was making up this story in 
order to cover for the fact that she had framed Mr. Sallings so as to gain access to his 
property.  (See R., pp.126-27.)  Simply put, the State cannot escape the fact that the 
CI’s credibility, including her apparent reputation for honesty, was a central component 
of its case.  Therefore, trial counsel’s objectively-unreasonable failure to impeach her 
credibility prejudiced Mr. Sallings. 
Since Mr. Sallings alleged genuine issues of material fact under both prongs of 




Mr. Sallings respectfully requests this Court reverse the order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 11th day of April, 2017. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of April, 2017, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
TONY CURTIS SALLINGS 
450 J STREET APT 32 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83402 
  
DANE H WATKINS JR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
  
STEVAN H THOMPSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN  




      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
BRD/eas 
 
 
